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Paternalism and the Public Household 





The	 ancient	 Greek	 conception	 of	 oikonomia	 is	 often	 dismissed	 as	
irrelevant	for	making	sense	of	the	contemporary	economic	world.	In	this	
paper,	 I	 emphasize	 a	 thread	 that	 runs	 through	 the	 history	 of	 economic	
thought	 connecting	 the	 oikos	 to	 modern	 public	 economics.	 By	
conceptualizing	 the	 public	 economy	 as	 a	 public	 household,	 Richard	 A.	
Musgrave	(1910-2007)	set	foot	in	a	long	tradition	of	analogy	between	the	
practically	oriented	household	and	the	state.	
Despite	 continuous	 references	 to	 the	 domestic	 model	 by	 major	
economists	throughout	the	centuries,	the	analogy	has	clashed	with	liberal	
values	 associated	 with	 the	 public	 sphere	 since	 the	 eighteenth	 century.	
Musgrave’s	 conceptualization	 of	 public	 expenditures	 represents	 one	
episode	 of	 this	 continuing	 tension.	 His	 defense	 of	 merit	 goods,	 in	
particular,	 was	 rejected	 by	 many	 American	 economists	 in	 the	 1960s	
because	 it	 was	 perceived	 as	 a	 paternalistic	 intervention	 by	 the	 state.	 I	
suggest	that	the	accusation	of	paternalism	should	not	come	as	a	surprise	
once	 the	 ‘domestic’	 elements	 in	 Musgrave’s	 conceptualization	 of	 the	
public	 sector	 are	 highlighted.	 I	 develop	 three	 points	 of	 the	 analogy	 in	
Musgrave’s	 public	 household	 which	 echo	 recurring	 patterns	 of	 thought	
about	the	state.	
	
                                               
1	 M.Desmarais-Tremblay@gold.ac.uk.	 Institute	 of	 Management	 Studies,	 Goldmiths,	





by	a	mobility	 fellowship	 from	the	Swiss	National	Science	Foundation	(P1LAP1_161887).	 I	
am	grateful	to	Eric	Brandstedt,	Keith	Tribe,	Magdalena	Małecka,	Paul	Dudenhefer,	Laetitia	
Lenel,	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Centre	 Walras-Pareto	 and	 two	 anonymous	 referees	 for	 their	
feedback.	I	am	solely	responsible	for	all	errors.	
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2995447
	 2	
If government wants not merely to facilitate the attainment of certain standards by the 
individuals but to make certain that everybody attains them, it can do so only by 
depriving individuals of any choice in the matter. Thus the welfare state becomes a 
household state in which a paternalistic power controls most of the income of the 
community and allocates it to individuals in the forms and quantities which it thinks they 
need or deserve (Hayek 1960, 377). 
In	The	Constitution	of	Liberty,	F.	A.	Hayek	warned	against	 the	expansive	use	of	 the	
state’s	 coercive	 power	 to	 satisfy	 individual	 needs.	 Expanding	 power	 for	 that	
purpose,	Hayek	argued,	would	deprive	citizens	of	their	liberty	to	spend	their	income	
as	they	chose.	In	exercising	such	power,	the	state	would	in	effect	act	as	a	father	does	
toward	his	 family–that	 is,	with	 complete	authority.	Tyranny	could	 then	not	be	 far	
behind.	 Whereas	 Hayek	 opposed	 substantial	 government	 redistribution	 of	
resources,	another	economist,	Richard	A.	Musgrave,	recognized	that	some	transfers	
in	 kind	 were	 indeed	 a	 responsibility	 of	 the	 government.	 In	 his	 Theory	 of	 Public	
Finance,	Musgrave	(1959)	defended	the	provision	of	merit	goods	by	the	government	
to	 satisfy	 important	 individual	 needs	 that	 could	 not	 be	 left	 to	 market	 allocation.	
Musgrave	 posited	 that	 the	 government	 had	 to	 subsidize	 school	 lunches,	 health	
services	and	housing	for	the	poor,	even	if	these	goods	could	technically	be	allocated	
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However,	 the	 provision	 of	 merit	 goods	 violated	 the	 principle	 of	 consumer	
sovereignty,	thereby	challenging	a	central	tenet	of	the	New	Welfare	Economics.2	As	
a	 result,	 the	 concept	 was	 rejected	 by	 many	 economists.	 For	 instance,	 Charles	 E.	
McLure	 (1968,	 482)	 argued	 forcefully	 that	 “Musgrave’s	 entire	 concept	 of	 merit	
wants	 [goods]	 has	 no	 place	 in	 a	 normative	 theory	 of	 the	 public	 household	 based	
upon	individual	preference.”	In	an	assertion	which	evoked	the	libertarian	attack	of	
Hayek,	McLure	warned	that	“to	argue	that	 the	government	knows	what	 is	best	 for	
the	 uninformed	 or	 misinformed	 citizen	 is	 to	 invite	 paternalism	 and	
authoritarianism”	(p.	481).	Charles	and	Westaway	(1981)	also	rejected	the	concept	
of	merit	wants	 for	 its	paternalistic	character.	Nonetheless,	not	all	economists	have	
been	 troubled	 by	 Musgrave’s	 merit	 wants,	 even	 if	 they	 were	 aware	 of	 their	




desire	 to	 build	 a	 theory	 of	 the	 public	 economy	 for	 his	 contemporary	 democratic	
society,	 and	 a	 theory	 that	 is	 based	 on	 a	 household	 perspective.	 I	 think	 that	 the	
paternalism	 charge	 against	merit	 goods	 is	 not	 a	 rejection	 of	 specific	 policies	 (e.g.	
transfers	 in	 kinds),	 but	 a	 criticism	 against	 the	 household	 approach	 to	 the	 public	
sector.	The	debate	on	the	legitimacy	of	merit	goods	is	like	the	tip	of	an	iceberg.	The	
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accusation	of	paternalism	should	not	come	as	a	surprise	once	the	domestic	elements	
in	Musgrave’s	conceptualization	of	 the	public	sector	are	highlighted.	 It	 is	precisely	
those	elements	 that	would	be	 rejected	by	proponents	of	 a	catallaxis	 approach	 like	
James	M.	Buchanan	and	Hayek.	
Drawing	 from	 John	 Stuart	Mill	 (1859),	 Ronald	Dworkin	 (1972,	 65)	 defined	
paternalism	 as	 “interference	with	 a	 person’s	 liberty	 of	 action	 justified	 by	 reasons	
referring	 exclusively	 to	 the	welfare,	 good,	happiness,	 needs,	 interests	 or	 values	of	
the	 person	 being	 coerced”.	 An	 accusation	 of	 paternalism	 often	 invokes	 an	
application	of	a	norm,	or	power,	outside	of	its	legitimate	sphere	of	action,	or	so	says	
the	 accuser.	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 political	 philosophy,	 there	 are	 two	 closely	
related	 problems	 with	 the	 transfer	 of	 norms	 from	 one	 sphere	 of	 life	 to	 another,	
which	amounts	here	to	thinking	about	the	public	in	terms	of	the	private.	First,	 it	is	
generally	acknowledged	that	adults	should	not	be	treated	as	children.	Most	liberal	
thinkers	 agree	 that	 paternalism	 is	 not	 a	 problem	when	 it	 is	 restricted	 to	 parents	




Second,	 it	 is	 important	 that	 the	 public	 and	 the	 domestic	 spheres	 be	 kept	
separate,	for	as	Hannah	Arendt	famously	argued,	it	is	only	in	the	public	sphere	that	
citizens	 realize	 specific	 dimensions	of	 their	 human	 existence,	 dimensions	 that	 are	
distinct	 from	the	natural	and	necessary	 interactions	of	 the	domestic	 life	organized	
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for	biological	survival.	This	translated	into	a	defense	of	the	autonomy	of	the	public	
sphere	 for	 political	 activity	 from	 the	 economic	 activities	 of	 production	 and	
consumption	 for	 the	 satisfaction	of	basic	needs.	By	 combining	both	a	 reference	 to	
the	domestic	and	to	the	public	spheres,	Musgrave’s	public	household	appears	in	this	
perspective	as	an	oxymoron.	 It	reflects	a	 long-standing	tension	 in	the	discipline	to	
which	Arendt	(1958,	28)	alluded	to	when	she	claimed	that	“the	very	term	‘political	
economy’	would	have	been	[to	the	Ancients]	a	contradiction	in	terms”.	
Admittedly,	 to	 the	 modern	 student,	 the	 tension	 between	 the	 modes	 of	
reasoning	 imported	 from	 the	 private	 household	 and	 those	 connate	 to	 the	 civil	
society	does	not	span	the	whole	body	of	economic	knowledge.	Most	of	it	grew	out	of	
reflections	on	the	commercial	society	and	took	the	form	of	law-like	generalizations	
inspired	 by	 natural	 sciences.	 Nonetheless,	 to	 conceptualize	 the	 public	 sector,	
economists	in	the	twentieth	century	borrowed	from	models	of	the	market	and	from	
models	 of	 the	 family.	 In	 this	 paper,	 I	 argue	 that	 by	 conceptualizing	 the	 public	
economy,	or	the	economic	domain	of	the	state,	as	a	public	household,	Musgrave	sets	
foot	in	a	long	tradition	of	analogy	between	the	household	and	the	state.	
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disagree	 with	 the	 view,	 defended	 for	 instance	 by	 Dumont	 (1977),	 that	 political	
economy	 departed	 from	 moral	 considerations	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century.	 The	
Aristotelian	definition	of	economics	 is	often	dismissed	as	irrelevant	 to	 the	modern	
economy.	I	show	that	it	still	influences	the	way	we	conceive	the	public	economy.	Yet,	
I	 argue	 that	 the	 domestic	 analogy	 clashes	with	 liberal	 values	 associated	with	 the	
public	 sphere	 ever	 since	 the	 latter’s	 emergence	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century.	
Musgrave’s	model	of	the	public	household	represents	one	episode	of	this	continuing	
tension	 in	 liberal	 political	 economy.	 Moreover,	 I	 am	 not	 claiming	 Musgrave	 and	
others	 are	 fully	 conscious	 of	 this	 tension.	 I	 am	 not	 judging	 this	 as	 good	 or	 bad,	
neither	do	I	claim	we	can	completely	resolve	this	tension.	Rather,	as	Lorraine	Daston	
(2002,	374–75)	put	 it,	 the	role	of	historical	analysis	 is	 to	highlight	 this	underlying	
tension:	
Unlike psychoanalysis, history does not claim that tracing the genesis of a neurosis or a 
pattern of thought and sensibility will ipso facto liberate one from either. At best, 
historical analysis can show the contingency of such subterranean patterns and drag 
them into the light of conscious scrutiny. It can neither refute nor replace them. 
One	contribution	of	the	paper	is	thus	to	underline	recurrent	themes	in	the	history	of	
political	 and	 economic	 thought.	 Another	 is	 to	 show	 how	 a	 specifically	 German	
tradition	 in	 economics	 kept	 alive	 the	 original	 practical	 orientation	 of	 economic	
discourse.	 This	 continuity	was	 heavily	 challenged	 at	 two	 points:	 at	 the	 demise	 of	
Cameralism	in	the	end	of	 the	eighteenth	century,	and	at	 the	brink	of	World	War	II	
when	German-speaking	academics	immigrated	to	the	US	and	had	to	integrate	into	a	
new	 intellectual	 environment.	 Besides,	 this	 paper	 also	 contributes	 to	 our	
understanding	of	the	deep	intellectual	background	of	Musgrave.	An	investigation	of	
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2995447
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A Historical Sketch of the Household Analogy 
Without parallels and analogies between one sphere and another of thought and action, 
whether conscious or not, the unity of our experience—our experience itself—would 
not be possible. [...] The models, once they are made conscious and explicit, may turn 
out to be obsolete or misleading. Yet even the most discredited among these models in 
politics—the social contract, patriarchalism, the organic society and so forth, must have 
started with some initial validity to have had the influence on thought that they have 
had (Berlin 1962, 18). 
The Greek Oikos 
In	 Classical	 Greece,	 the	 father,	 or	 householder,	 and	 the	 statesman	 were	 often	
thought	of	in	connection	with	each	other,	implying	that	their	roles	were	comparable.	
Plato	 suggested	 in	 the	Statesman	 that	 there	was	no	 significant	difference	between	
“the	grandeur	of	a	large	house	and	the	majesty	of	a	small	state,”	both	statesmanship	
and	 householding	 were	 objects	 of	 the	 same	 practical	 science	 (Plato	 1925,	 13).	
Aristotle	(1995,	1)	disagreed,	but	he	acknowledged	that	the	household	and	the	state	
were	both	communities,	associations	with	a	commonly	shared	object,	organized	for	
a	 purpose.	 In	 the	Nicomachean	Ethics,	 he	 drew	 the	 analogy	 between	 the	 different	
communities:	 “One	 can	 also	 find	 in	 households	 resemblances	 to	 these	 political	
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systems	and,	as	it	were,	models	of	them.	The	community	of	a	father	and	his	sons	has	
the	 form	 of	 a	 kingship,	 since	 the	 father	 cares	 for	 his	 children.”	 (Aristotle	 2000,	
1160a-1161a	,	156).		
It	is	well	known	that	the	word	economy	derives	from	the	Ancient	Greek	oikonomia,	
which	 in	 turns	 derives	 from	 oikos,	 the	 household,	 and	 nomos,	 the	 law.	 Roughly	
speaking,	 the	 semi-autarkic	 private	 estate	 was	 the	 center	 of	 economic	 life	 in	
Classical	Greece.3	The	household	was	a	natural	association	of	persons	organized	for	
the	 purpose	 of	 needs	 satisfaction.	 The	 relations	 of	 domination	 and	 subordination	
between	 the	 master	 and	 the	 other	 members—wife,	 children	 and	 slaves—were	
nevertheless	 bonded	 by	 a	 mutuality	 (philia)	 (Booth	 1993,	 38–39).	 In	 the	
(pseudo)Aristotle’s	 Oeconomica,	 the	 four	 economic	 activities	 of	 the	 head	 of	 the	
household	 are:	 acquiring	 resources,	 preserving	 or	 guarding	 what	 was	 acquired,	
ordering	his	property,	and	making	proper	use	of	these	resources	(Aristotle	1920).	A	
thrifty	organization	of	his	estate	allowed	the	master	to	dedicate	most	of	his	time	to	
nobler	 activities.	 Hence,	 the	 surplus	 of	 household	 production	 was	 not	 generally	
reinvested	 for	 growth	 but	 was	 rather	 consumed	 in	 leisure	 time	 and	 political	
involvement	 in	 public	 affairs	 (Leshem	 2016,	 229).	 For	 the	 Greeks,	 the	 economic	
activity	of	 the	household	was	embedded	 in	a	 larger	ethical	 conception	that	placed	
political	 activity	 at	 a	 higher	 level	 of	 the	 good.	 Household	 management	 was	 also	
preparing	men	 for	 a	 virtuous	 public	 life	 (Xenophon	1923;	Aristotle	 1995,	 18–19).	
                                               
3	 Clearly,	 the	 households	 were	 not	 completely	 autarkic,	 and	 some	 level	 of	 trade	 was	
conducted	 within	 the	 cities,	 and	 between	 them,	 but	 such	 commercial	 ventures	 were	
generally	reserved	for	outsiders.	
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Political	liberty	could	be	enjoyed	by	citizens	because	their	economic	household	had	






citizens	by	guaranteeing	material	 security	 to	 the	private	households	 (Ritter,	1963,	
171).	
Aristotle	 envisaged	 a	 practical	 philosophy	 composed	 of	 ethics,	 (domestic)	
economics	 and	 politics.	 Its	 object	 was	 the	 realization	 of	 human	 nature	 through	
praxis	 (Ritter	 1963,	 148).	 It	 was	 a	 normative	 discourse	 according	 to	 which	 man	




By	 the	 time	 Aristotle	 was	 writing	 in	 the	 fourth	 century	 BC,	 the	 model	 of	
public	 life	he	was	rationalizing	was	already	 fading	away,	but	 it	continued	to	 frame	
economic	and	political	 thought	 for	 centuries.	As	Peter	Groenewegen	 (1987,	7806)	
argued,	 “political	 economy	 has	 invariably	 experienced	 difficulties	 in	 discarding	
earlier	 views,	 and	 traces	 of	 old	 doctrine	 are	 intermingled	 with	 the	 latest	
developments	in	the	science”.	
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The Medieval and Early Modern Conceptualizations 
The	 household	 model	 was	 kept	 alive	 by	 the	 Christian	 tradition	 throughout	 the	
Medieval	period,	and	it	was	later	regenerated	in	Early	modern	times	with	the	rise	of	
new	forms	of	governance.	
Foucault	 (2007)	suggested	that	 the	Church	power	 so	dominant	 in	 the	West	
for	 centuries	 relied	 on	 the	 pastoral	model.	 The	 Church’s	 actual	 effectiveness	was	
based	on	 its	ability	 to	copy	the	bureaucratic	structure	of	 the	Roman	empire,	but	 it	
presented	itself	to	the	world	as	a	large	family.	Originally	an	Eastern	Mediterranean	
idea,	the	pastoral	imaginaries	evoke	the	relation	between	a	shepherd	and	his	herd.	
The	 Church’s	 hierarchical	 structure	 is	 modeled	 on	 the	 image	 of	 the	 benevolent	
pastor	who	cares	for	the	well-being	of	his	flock.	The	good	shepherd	is	dedicated	to	
his	sheep;	he	feeds	them,	heals	them,	and	protects	them	from	dangers.	The	pastoral	
economy	 is	 definitely	 not	 centered	 on	 production	 and	 accumulation:	 it	 is	 an	
economy	 of	 care	 and	 a	 politics	 of	 paternal	 authoritarian	 rule.	 Living	 in	 troubled	
times,	the	early	Christians	took	comfort	in	being	part	of	a	large	universal	community	
which	 was	 explicitly	 modeled	 on	 the	 family.	 The	 pastors	 assumed	 the	 roles	 of	
fathers,	 and	 the	 other	 members	 occupied	 roles	 of	 brothers,	 sisters,	 sons,	 and	
daughters.	 Scholastic	 thought	 explicitly	 extended	 the	 authority	of	 God	 on	 earth	 to	
that	 of	 kings	 over	 their	 temporal	 domain	 and	 to	 that	 of	 fathers	 over	 their	




The	 agricultural	 economy	 of	 the	 feudal	 age	 was	 conceptualized	 in	 early	
modern	times	in	popular	husbandry	tracts	on	the	management	of	the	rulers’	estates	
(Tribe	 2015,	 27–42).	 This	 practical	 discourse	 bore	 the	 influence	 of	 Christian	
morality.	In	the	16th	and	17th	centuries,	the	German	Hausväterliteratur	presented	a	
neo-Aristotelian	vision	of	the	patriarchal	figure	(Hausvater,	or	husbandman)	as	the	
central	 figure	 of	 the	 good	 government	 of	 the	 estate	 (omitting	 the	 subtleties	 of	
Aristotle’s	political	 thought).	His	duties	 included	attending	 to	 the	well-being	of	 its	






As	 a	 matter	 of	 philology,	 the	 French	 word	mesnage	 (ménage)	 used	 by	 De	
Serres	 is	 the	 root	 of	 management	 and	 translates	 into	 household	 in	 English.	 The	
German	term	Haushaltung,	which	translates	into	householding,	was	used	to	describe	
the	catering	for	one’s	group,	whether	it	is	a	family,	or	a	kingdom	(Polanyi	1977,	41).	
Today	 Haushalt	 also	 means	 budget;	 hence	 in	 nineteenth	 century	 public	 finance	
Staatshaushalt	(or	öffentlichen	Haushalt)	will	be	used	to	describe	the	public	budget	
                                               
4	See	Leo	XIII’s	Rerum	novarum	(1891)	and	Pius	XI’s	Quadragesimo	Anno	(1931).	
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or	the	Public	household,	a	double	meaning	from	which	Musgrave	will	draw	to	build	
his	 own	 view	 (see	 Section	 2	 below).	 Besides	Oekonomie,	 the	 German	 lexicon	 has	








image	 of	 a	 commonwealth	 [république],	 and	 domestic	 power	 resembles	 sovereign	
power.	 It	 follows	that	 the	right	government	of	 the	household	 is	 the	model	of	right	
government	 in	 the	 commonwealth.”	 (Bodin,	 1576,	 8)	 For	 Bodin,	 states	 were	 not	
isomorphic	to	households	since	each	state	was	composed	of	multiple	families.	Still,	
both	were	ruled	by	a	pater	familias	(Becker,	2014).	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 new	 tracts	 centered	 around	 the	 idea	 of	 reason	 of	 state	
taught	 to	princes	 how	 to	 justify,	 enlarge,	 and	maintain	 their	 power	 over	 land	 and	
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for	 the	 administrators	 of	 the	 Kammer,	 originally	 designating	 the	 palace	 of	 the	
Prince—in	 Latin,	 Camera	 means	 chamber	 (Tribe	 1995,	 9).	 Many	 were	 directly	
inspired	by	the	Aristotelian	corpus	(Schefold,	2016).	In	spite	of	being	conceived	as	
the	management	of	 the	 realm	of	 the	Prince,	Cameralism	adopted	an	early-modern	
outlook	as	it	was	not	modeled	on	the	family;	rather	it	concerned	the	government	of	
a	 population	 as	 a	more	 complex	 object	 than	 an	 aggregation	 of	 families	 (Foucault	
2007,	 105).	 In	 the	 narrow	 sense,	 Kameralwissenschaft	 designated	 a	 normative	
discourse	 on	 the	 public	 finance	 of	 the	 prince.	 In	 its	 broader	 meaning	
Kameralwissenschaften	 referred	 to	 several	 sciences	 of	 the	 state	 taught	 to	
prospective	administrators:	Oekonomie,	Polizei,	and	Finance	(Lindenfeld	1997,	14–
18).		
In	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 18th	 century,	 attempts	were	made	 to	 systematize	
cameralism	following	the	deductive	method	of	 the	mathematician	and	philosopher	
Christian	 Wolff.5	 The	 most	 remarkable	 contribution	 in	 that	 regard	 was	 made	 by	
Johann	H.	G.	 von	 Justi.	He	 theorized	 the	 internal	 administration	of	 the	state	as	 the	
science	of	the	police	(Polizei).	As	part	of	the	discipline	of	Cameralism,	the	police	was	
mainly	 concerned	 with	 urban	 administration.	 By	 extension,	 the	 police	 comprised	
“everything	that	can	contribute	to	the	happiness	of	the	citizens,	mainly	maintaining	
order	 and	 discipline,	 the	 regulations	 that	 tend	 to	 make	 life	 convenient	 and	 to	
provide	the	things	which	they	need	to	subsist”	(von	Justi,	1769,	18).	Following	Wolff,	
                                               
5	 While	 influenced	 by	 the	 metaphysics	 of	 Leibnz,	 Wolff	 had	 been	 teaching	 practical	
philosophy	 using	 the	 old	 Aritotelian	 triptych	 of	 ethics,	 domestic	 economic	 and	 politics	
(Ritter	1967,	107;	Garner,	2006,	34).	










1769,	 26).	 The	 good	 prince	 had	 to	 provide	 public	 gardens,	 opera	 houses,	 art	
galleries	 and	many	 landmarks	 which	 contribute	 to	 the	 embellishment	 of	 the	 city	
(Justi	1769,	57).	Interestingly,	these	policy	proposals,	whether	it	be	the	correction	of	
undesirable	behavior,	or	 the	 funding	of	cultural	goods,	resemble	Musgrave’s	merit	
goods,	 albeit	 in	 a	 totally	 different	 context.	 In	 that	 pre-liberal	 age,	 what	would	 be	
considered	 today	 as	 paternalistic	 policies	 did	 not	 pose	 any	 problem.	 Cameralism	
was	 a	 non-judicial	 direct	 form	 of	 state	 intervention	 through	 ordinances	 and	
regulations.	There	was	no	 conceptualization	of	 an	autonomous	and	self-regulating	
civil	 society	 (Tribe,	 1988,	64;	 1995,	 12).	 The	 social	 order	 was	 under	 the	 direct	
control	of	the	Prince	and	needed	constant	regulation	(Tribe	1988,	31–32).		
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The Emergence of Political Economy 
The	 first	 texts	 explicitly	 dealing	 with	 political	 economy	 drew	 from	 the	 domestic	
model	 inspired	 by	 Aristotle	 (Tribe	 2015,	 31).	 For	 instance,	 in	 his	 Traicté	 de	
l’œconomie	 politique,	 the	 17th-century	 Frenchman	 Antoyne	 de	 Montchrestien	
argued	 that	 “private	 occupations	 make	 the	 public	 one.	 […]	 Thus,	 political	 art	
depends	mediately	 on	 the	 economic;	 and	 because	 it	 conforms	 to	 it,	 it	 also	 has	 to	
follow	 its	 example.	 Since,	 when	 it	 is	 properly	 addressed,	 the	 good	 domestic	
government	is	the	template	and	the	model	for	the	public	one”	(Montchrestien	1615,	






a	private	 family,	 is	 therefore	to	provide	 for	 the	nourishment,	 the	other	wants,	and	
the	employment	of	every	individual”.	Children	and	servants	were	considered	“object	




same	 arbitrary	 way	 that	 the	 master	 of	 the	 household	 could	 set	 its	 own.	 The	
statesman	 took	over	a	 country	with	already	existing	 institutions	and	a	population	





of	 its	 members.	 Moreover,	 economy	 was	 an	 art,	 with	 a	 practical	 orientation,	 and	
guided	 by	 prudence.	 Finally,	 the	 economy	had	 a	 purpose,	 that	 of	 satisfying	wants	
(ibid.).	




thinking	bore	both	 the	 influence	of	David	Hume	and	 that	of	 the	 cameralists	 (Hont	
2005,	298;	Tribe	2006,	546).	Steuart’s	 Inquiry	breaks	 from	the	Cameralists	 in	 that	
the	 right	 policies	were	 to	 be	 revealed	 by	 an	 empirical	 and	 comparative	 historical	
analysis	 and	 they	would	 consist	mostly	of	 indirect	 interventions	by	 “inducing”	 the	
subjects,	by	 “alluring	 to	 their	private	 interest”	 (Steuart	1767,	3).	Government	was	
not	a	matter	of	direct	authoritative	and	constant	intervention.	Nonetheless,	Steuart	








distinction	 between	 paternal	 rule	 and	 the	 State	 into	 philosophical	 modernity.	 In	
Leviathan,	Hobbes	acknowledged	that	there	was	a	structural	continuity	between	the	
domination	of	 a	 father	over	his	household	and	 that	of	 a	 small	king	over	his	 realm	
(Hobbes	 1651,	 142).	 These	 natural	 forms	 of	 dominion	 were	 sustained	 by	 the	
common	fear	of	the	ruler.	Yet,	individuals	could	form	a	covenant	to	protect	their	life	
against	 the	 potential	 threat	 posed	 by	 others,	 and	 by	 doing	 so	 instituted	 a	
commonwealth	which	replaced	the	natural	forms	of	domination.	The	social	contract	
changed	 the	 relations	 between	men,	 who	would	 owe	 obedience	 to	 the	 sovereign	
(whether	it	be	a	single	monarch	or	an	assembly	of	men),	but	also	within	the	family	
where	civil	law	would	hereafter	apply.	
A	 few	years	 later,	 John	Locke	refined	Hobbes’s	arguments	by	criticizing	the	
paternal	 model	 that	 Robert	 Filmer	 had	 used	 to	 justify	 absolute	 monarchy.	 Using	




57).	 In	 the	 first	of	his	Two	Treatises	of	Government,	Locke	(1689)	set	out	 to	refute	
Filmer’s	argument	on	his	own	ground,	by	debunking	 inconsistencies	and	resorting	
to	 theological	 arguments.	 In	 his	 Second	 treatise,	 Locke	 proposed	 his	 own	 positive	
solution	to	the	problem	of	the	state’s	legitimacy.	His	criticism	of	absolute	monarchy	
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rested	 on	 a	 careful	 analysis	of	 the	 difference	between	 the	 family	 and	 the	 political	
community	(Locke,	1689,	ST	§2,	101;	See	also	Grant	2003).	For	Locke,	the	authority	
of	 the	 sovereign	was	 based	 on	 a	 voluntary	 agreement	 by	 free,	 equal	 and	 rational	
individuals	for	the	purpose	of	protecting	their	life,	liberty	and	property.	In	contrast,	
the	family	was	centered	around	a	voluntary	contract	between	a	man	and	a	woman	
for	 the	purpose	of	 raising	 children	 (Locke	1689,	 §78,	133).	The	 “conjugal	 society”	
lasted	 as	 long	 as	 it	was	 necessary	 to	 support	and	 educate	 the	 young	 ones	 and	 to	
allow	them	to	become	fully	rational	individuals	(Locke	1689,	§58,	124).	This	meant	
that	 parental	 authority	 was	 temporary	 in	 nature	 and	 could	 not	 therefore	 be	 the	
model	 for	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 political	 community	 (ibid.	 §55,	 123).	 To	 achieve	 his	
criticism	of	the	household	model	of	politics,	Locke	reconceptualized	the	family	as	a	
voluntary	compact	between	a	man	and	a	woman,	 thus	bringing	 it	 farther	 from	the	
despotic	model	of	the	Greek	oikos	(Booth	1993,	148).	
The	 foundation	 of	 a	 legitimate	 political	 government	 on	 the	 consent	 of	 free	
individuals	was	a	common	theme	of	modern	liberal	thought.	It	was	also	addressed	
by	 Rousseau	 in	 his	Discourse	 on	 political	 economy.	 Rousseau	 started	 off	 from	 the	
common	 understanding	 of	 the	 term	 économie	 in	 France	 in	 the	 18th	 century,	
explicitly	 distinguishing	 between	 Aristotle’s	 understanding	 of	 oikonomia	 and	 its	
extension	to	the	government	of	the	great	family	that	the	state	constitutes	(Rousseau	
1755,	 3).	 Siding	with	 Locke	 against	 Filmer,	 Rousseau	 argued	 that	 paternal	 power	
was	 natural	 and	 benevolent,	 whereas	 political	 power	 was	 conventional	 and	
sometimes	abused	by	the	rulers.	In	the	domestic	sphere,	the	heart	guided	the	action	
of	 the	 father,	 but	 public	 reason	 and	 the	 law	 should	 guide	 action	 in	 the	 political	
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sphere.	A	 few	decades	 later	economics	and	politics	departed,	 thanks	 in	part	 to	 the	
reframing	of	the	subject	of	political	economy	by	Jean-Baptiste	Say	(Tribe	2015,	60;	
Lallement	 2002).	 In	 the	 preface	 to	 his	 Traité	 d’économie	 politique,	 Say	 criticized	
Steuart	 and	 Rousseau	 for	 confusing	 political	 economy	 and	 politics.	 For	 Say,	 the	
former	was	an	 inquiry	on	the	production,	distribution	and	consumption	of	wealth,	
and	 should	 not	 be	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 practical	 household	 rules	 to	 the	 larger	
political	 family	 (Say	1803,	29).	The	 influence	of	 the	British	 classical	 tradition	also	
fostered	this	isolation	as	economists	focused	more	on	theorizing	the	natural	law	of	
value,	at	the	cost	of	moral	and	political	examinations.	
At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 century,	 Immanuel	 Kant	 borrowed	 from	 Locke’s	 and	
Rousseau’s	 contractarian	 doctrines	 of	 the	 state	 to	 construct	 what	 should	 be	 the	
founding	principles	of	a	just	state.	In	that	respect,	Kant	followed	the	a	priori	method	
of	natural	 law	established	by	Wolff,	while	 rejecting	his	dogmatic	metaphysics	and	
his	 teleological	 conception	 of	 nature.	 Kant	 also	 rejected	 the	 eudemonistic	
orientation	of	 the	 state	defended	by	Wolff	 and	von	 Justi	 (Garner	2006,	246).	Kant	





does	 not	 infringe	 upon	 that	 freedom	 of	 others	 to	 strive	 for	 a	 like	 end	which	 can	
coexist	with	 the	 freedom	of	 everyone	 in	accordance	with	a	possible	universal	 law	




private	 agents	making	 a	 public	 use	 of	 their	 own	 understanding	 (Habermas	 1962,	
116).	 Looking	 over	 the	 past	 century,	 Kant	 saw	 the	 Enlightenment	 as	 humanity’s	
coming	 of	 age:	 “Enlightenment	 is	 the	 human	 being’s	 emergence	 from	 his	 self-
incurred	minority.”	 (Kant	 1784,	17).	 Stretching	 the	metaphor,	 this	meant	 that	 the	
rise	 of	 a	modern	 public	 sphere	was	 correlative	 of	 a	 rejection	 of	 the	 authoritarian	
view	on	 individual’s	 epistemic	and	moral	 abilities.	Following	Locke	and	Rousseau,	
Kant	explicitly	rejected	the	paternalistic	political	model	of	the	state	as	despotic:	
A government established on the principle of benevolence toward the people 
like that of a father toward his children - that is, a paternalistic government (imperium 
paternale), in which the subjects, like minor children who cannot distinguish between 
what is truly useful or harmful to them, are constrained to behave only passively, so as 
to wait only upon the judgement of the head of state as to how they should be happy 
and, as for his also willing their happiness, only upon his kindness – is the greatest 
despotism thinkable (a constitution that abrogates all the freedom of the subjects, who 
in that case have no rights at all) (Kant 1793, 291).6 
	
The	 liberal	 reconfiguration	 of	 the	 economy	 and	 politics	 that	 I	 have	 been	 outlying	
from	Hobbes	to	Kant	underlined	two	 important	and	related	 features	of	Modernity.	











other	 words,	 the	 individual	 is	 sovereign	 (Audard	 2009,	 55	 ff.).	 This	 implied	 the	
rejection	 of	 the	 autocratic	 paternal	model	 for	both	 the	 family	 and	 for	 the	 state.	 It	
also	 implies	 that	 governments	 must	 abide	 by	 the	 rule	 of	 Law.	 The	 law	 allows	
government	 to	 rule	 individuals	 by	 treating	 them	 equally	 and	 without	 depriving	
them	of	 their	 freedom.7	Kant	went	even	 further	 than	Rousseau:	not	only	was	self-













                                               
7	According	 to	Constant,	 citizens	of	modern	 countries	understand	 liberty	 as	 an	 individual	
“right	to	be	subjected	only	to	the	laws”	(Constant	1819,	310).	





Closer Ancestors of Musgrave 
Before	 turning	 to	 Musgrave’s	 model	 of	 the	 public	 household,	 I	 have	 to	 briefly	
delineate	how	the	household	approach	of	 the	cameralist	 thinkers	had	evolved	 into	
the	practical	economic	theories	of	the	state	in	the	nineteenth	century.	Tribe	(1988,	
152)	 argues	 that	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 18th	 century	 the	 Cameralist	 orthodoxy	 was	
shattered	by	the	breaking	up	of	the	world	it	was	rationalizing	into	distinct	entities	of	
economy,	civil	society	and	the	state.	The	emergence	of	the	liberal	discourse	which	I	
highlighted	 above,	 especially	 in	 the	 Kantian	 synthesis,	 made	 room	 for	 a	 new	
Nationalökonomie	 to	 rise	 in	 the	nineteenth	 century,	borrowing	 from	Smithian	and	
‘Sayian’	economics,	as	well	as	from	elements	of	the	old	Cameralist	concerns	for	the	
State	 (Tribe	 1988,	 92,	 150;	 1995,	 28	 ff.).	 Garner	 (2006,	 381)	 also	 stresses	 the	
discontinuity,	arguing	that	a	concern	for	the	construction	of	a	national	market	space	
replaced	 the	 cameralist	 focus	 on	 direct	 management	 of	 the	 population	 and	
exploitation	of	local	territories.	
In	 contrast,	 Lindenfeld	 (1997,	 46)	 points	 out	 the	 institutional	 continuity	
between	 the	 cameralist	 tradition	 and	 the	 Sciences	 of	 state	 (Staatswissenschaften).	
Indeed,	 the	 latter	 group	 of	 disciplines	 did	 not	 have	 to	 fight	 for	 the	 legitimacy	 of	
university	 teaching	 on	 topics	 related	 to	 public	 administration	 (Grimmer-Solem	
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2014,	88).	These	new	disciplines	also	kept	the	practical	orientation	required	for	the	
training	 of	 bureaucrats	 and	 eventually	 trying	 to	 satisfy	 the	 aspirations	 for	 social	
change	of	the	younger	generation	at	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century.	
The	 central	 transitional	 figure	was	 Karl	 Heinrich	 Rau,	 whose	 Lehrbuch	 der	
politischen	Oekonomie	 constituted	the	reference	textbook	for	 the	major	part	of	 the	
century	(Lindenfield,	1997,	119).	Rau	taught	old	cameralist	subjects	like	agriculture,	
commerce,	 and	political	science,	 as	well	 as	new	 theoretical	 economics.	 In	 the	 first	
volume	of	his	textbook,	Rau	(1837,	2)	argued	that	the	purpose	of	the	economy	was	
to	 satisfy	 needs.	 This	 end	would	 be	 studied	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 individual	 (or	 the	
family),	thus	constituting	domestic	economics,	or	at	the	level	of	the	state,	which	was	
the	 object	 of	 political	 economy	 (or	 public	 economics).	 By	 conferring	 needs	 to	 the	
state,	Rau	extended	the	human	anthropology	of	needs	to	the	juridical	person	of	the	
state.	Even	 if	Rau	studied	extensively	 the	causal	 laws	of	 the	economy,	he	also	paid	
great	 attention	 to	 the	 practical	 economic	 sciences.	 The	 duty	 of	 government	 was	





forces,	 and	would	 create	 a	 dangerous	 omnipotent	 power”	 (Rau,	 1837,	 9).	 Even	 if	
economic	policy	 incorporated	some	of	 the	rules	of	 the	Polizei,	 it	should	not	aim	at	
directly	controlling	the	behavior	of	individuals.	According	to	Rau,	the	duties	of	social	
welfare	could	not	be	adequately	fulfilled	by	the	government	without	acknowledging	






Adolph	 Wagner	 took	 charge	 of	 writing	 a	 new	 version	 of	 the	 Lehrbuch	 that	 still	
reflected	the	comprehensive	scope	and	the	classificatory	and	deliberative	approach	
of	Rau	(Lindenfeld	1997,	244).	By	the	next	decade,	 the	 importance	of	 the	practical	
dimension	of	political	economy	was	still	acknowledged,	even	by	Carl	Menger,	who	
otherwise	 did	 more	 than	 anyone	 else	 to	 challenge	 the	 German	 approach	 to	
economics.	(Menger	1883,	211).	
The	 work	 of	 the	 so-called	 historical	 school	 also	 bore	 the	 influence	 of	 the	
cameralist	 tradition	 (Lindenfeld	 1997,	 156,	 174).	 In	 his	 Principles	 of	 Political	
Economy,	Wilhem	Roscher	 used	 the	household	 analogy	 to	 describe	 the	 origin	 of	 a	
nation’s	economy:	
The public economy of a people has its origin simultaneously with the people. [...] Just 
as it may be shown, that the family which lives isolated from all others, contains, in 
itself, the germs of all political organization, so may it be demonstrated, that every 
independent household management contains the germs of all politico-economical 
activity. The public economy of a nation grows with the nation. (Roscher 1878, 84) 
This	line	of	argument	was	also	followed	by	Schmoller	who	associated	the	conceptual	
origin	 of	 oeconomia	 to	 the	 historical	 origins	 of	 social	 relations:	 the	 family	 is	 the	
starting	point	of	economics	and	 is	also	the	basic	social	unit	 from	which	larger	and	
more	complex	social	organizations	grew	(Schmoller	1900,	8	ff.).	Neither	Roscher	nor	




economy	 of	 the	 national	 community,	 was	 thought	 of	 as	 the	 union	 of	 private	 and	
public	economies	(Schmoller	1900,	13).	
The	historical	economists	showed	through	detailed	analysis	how	the	growth	
of	social	needs	resulted	 from	the	development	of	 industrial	society.	Already	at	 the	
beginning	 of	 the	 century,	 Hegel	 (1821,	 §	 195,	 231)	 had	 pointed	 out	 the	 limitless	
dynamic	of	wants	generation.	The	economic	sphere	took	an	increasing	hold	on	the	
life	of	individuals.	As	their	private	households	were	less	and	less	able	to	satisfy	their	
needs,	 individuals	 increasingly	 depended	 on	 the	 hazards	 of	 the	 capitalist	 system,	
resulting	in	the	pauperization	of	a	large	share	of	the	population.	This	problem	was	
framed	 as	 the	 Social	 question	 in	 the	 19th	 century.	 Laissez-faire	 policies	 led	 to	 a	
counter-movement,	 to	 social	 protests,	 to	 which	 the	 authorities	 responded	 by	
proposing	welfare	measures.	In	Jürgen	Habermas’	words,	this	historical	process	led	
to	 a	 concomitant	 “socialization	 of	 the	 state”	 and	 a	 “nationalization	 of	 the	 society”	
(Habermas	1962,	150).	The	social	question	was	both	a	historical	and	“sociological”	
problem	 to	 be	 explained,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 burning	 political	 issue	 to	 be	 resolved.	
Kathedersozialisten	 (chair	 socialists)	 were	 German	 academics	 who	 believed	 in	
human	 progress	 through	 political	 reform.	 In	 his	 inaugural	 manifesto	 for	 the	
foundation	of	the	Verein	für	Socialpolitk	in	1872,	Schmoller	argued	that	the	state	was	
the	 great	 moral	 educational	 institution	 of	 humanity	 (see	 St-Marc,	 1892,	 29;	
Schmoller,	 1894).	Wagner	 thought	 that	 political	 economy	 and	 the	 law	 should	 not	
only	take	man	as	he	is,	but	also	should	show	him	how	“he	could	develop	psychically	
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and	morally”	(Wagner	1892,	Vol.	I,	§6,	30).	For	him,	the	state	had	an	ethical	civilizing	
role	 to	play	 in	society;	 like	a	 father	 for	his	household,	 it	had	the	duty	to	shape	the	
moral	 attitudes	of	members	of	 the	 community	 (Corado	and	Solari	2010;	Prisching	
1997).	
The	outwardly	ethical	and	value-laden	reformist	agenda	of	 the	old	guard	of	
the	Verein	was	 criticized	by	younger	 “sociologists”	 like	Max	Weber	and	Ferdinand	
Tönnies	(Hagemann	2001,	165,	Lindenfeld	1997,	216-321).	Whereas	Schmoller	was	
interested	 in	 the	 broadly	 defined	 social	 constitution	 of	 the	 national	 economy,	
Tönnies	gave	in	his	most	famous	work	a	narrower	meaning	to	the	concept	of	social.	
He	proposed	a	dualistic	model	of	human	relations:	the	communal	type	and	the	social	
type.	 Community	 (Gemeinschaft)	 stemmed	 from	 the	 kinship	 bond,	 as	 society	
(Gesellschaft)	 was	 the	 sphere	 of	 self-interested	 and	 impersonal	 exchanges.	 The	
traditional	 family	 was	 taken,	 once	 again,	 as	 a	 model	 for	 the	 small	 communities:	
“Within	the	bonds	of	kinship	all	natural	authority	is	summed	up	in	the	authority	of	





based	 unit:	 “The	 table	 is	 the	 embodiment	 of	 the	 household	 itself,	 in	 that	 every	
member	has	his	place	there	and	receives	his	due	portion”	(Tönnies	1887,	40).	
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Despite	 major	 changes	 in	 political	 economy	 during	 the	 19th	 century,	 the	
legacy	 of	 a	 practical	 theorization	 of	 the	 state	 was	 transmitted	 through	 the	
generations	 down	 to	 the	 teaching	 that	 Musgrave	 received	 during	 the	 Weimar	
Republic	(Sturn	2010).		
Early	 twentieth-century	 literature	 on	 the	 public	 economy	often	 resorted	 to	





For	 instance,	 Friedrich	 von	 Wieser	 used	 the	 household	 label	 to	 name	 the	
public	 economy	 in	 his	 entry	 on	 Social	 Economics	 for	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 the	
Grundriss	der	Sozialökonomik,	edited	by	Max	Weber:	
It is common usage to speak of the public economy as the national household, or, as the 
case may be, the county household, city household, or generally the public household. 
The whole of public economy is thereby given a name taken from one single section of 
private economy. (Wieser 1914a, 190) 
In	his	Economy	and	Society,	published	posthumously	in	1922,	Max	Weber	remarked	
that	an	economic	agent	could	be	characterized	by	its	household	orientation:	
The continuous use and procurement of goods (either by production or exchange), 
whether for (1) the purposes of one’s own provision, or (2) obtaining other goods used 
by oneself, is called householding [Haushalt]. (Weber 2019, 174; 1922, 46). 
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Furthermore,	the	generality	of	the	category	was	acknowledged:	“The	form	taken	by	
the	 ‘household’	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 indifference.	 Both	 a	 ‘state	 budget’	 and	 a	 worker’s	
budget	come	under	the	same	category.”	(Weber	2019,	178).		
The	 interwar	 revival	 of	 Finanzwissenschaft	 also	 saw	 some	 attempts	 at	
bringing	 the	 new	 economic	 sociology	 to	 bear	 with	 organic	 and	 nationalistic	




receded	 lately	 (Ritschl	 1931b,	 5).	 Yet,	 Ritschl	 still	 thought	 it	 was	 a	 good	 starting	
point	to	analyze	the	communal	nature	of	the	public	economy:	
This consumption aspect [verbrauchswirtschaftliche] is expressed meaningfully in 
speaking of the public household [Staatshaushalte]. The economy of the State is 
comparable not to the firm [Erzeugungswirtschaft] but to the household [Haushalte]. 
The purpose is not to reap profits by satisfying the needs of other economic units, but to 
satisfy pure and partaking communal needs [Gemeinschaftsbedürfnisse]. The political 
community is the subject of both the economy and of the needs satisfied thereby. This 
consumption economy may include some production for its own use as well as some 
profit-making undertakings, for the sake of revenue (Ritschl, 1931a, 239; 1931b, 44). 
Before	 reviewing	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 difference	 between	 a	 state	 and	 a	 private	
economic	unit,	Ritschl	mentioned	the	obvious	points	of	comparisons.	They	are	both	
(1)	 distinct	 individual	 economies	 [Einzelwirtschaften]	 and	 basic	 forms	 of	 human	
economy	 [menschlichen	 Wirtschaftens],	 (2)	 headed	 by	 a	 united	 will	 [einheitlichen	
Willen],	 (3)	 economies	 of	 consumption,	 or	 householding	 [Verbrauchs-	 oder	
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Haushaltswirtschaft],	 and	 (4)	 can	 produce	 for	 their	 own	 consumption	
[Eigenproduktion],	or	for	the	market.	
Musgrave’s Public Household 
Musgrave’s	approach	to	the	public	sector	sits	at	a	crossroads	in	the	history	of	public	
finance.	Born	in	Königstein	in	1910	in	a	family	of	Jewish	background,	Richard	Abel-
Musgrave	 attended	 the	 University	 of	 Munich	 and	 the	 University	 of	 Heidelberg,	
where	 he	 graduated	 in	 1933	 (P.	 Musgrave,	 2009).	 His	 initial	 training	 was	 broad,	
including	courses	in	economics,	law,	sociology	and	public	finance.	Upon	graduation,	
he	 received	 a	 scholarship	 that	 allowed	 him	 to	 continue	 his	 studies	 in	 the	 United	
States	for	one	year.	He	decided	to	stay	longer	and	obtained	a	PhD	from	Harvard	in	
1937.	 In	 his	 dissertation,	 Musgrave	 took	 advantage	 of	 his	 acquaintance	 with	 the	
European	 scholarship	 in	 public	 finance,	 especially	 the	 German	 tradition.	 In	 this	
second	section,	I	show	how	he	borrowed	from	the	practical	domestic	models	of	the	
economy.	 Yet,	 thinking	 of	 the	 public	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 private	 conflicted	 with	 the	
liberal	underpinning	of	his	theory.	
The Structure of His Approach 
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Confronting the interpretation of Public Economy as communistic or household 
economy with the previously discussed interpretation of Public Economy as economy of 
exchange, similar to Market Economy, the ‘household approach’ must be given the 
preference. The latter approach is more realistic and hence more useful for the solution 




which	 Musgrave	 adopted,	 the	 public	 economy	 “arises	 out	 of	 the	 inability	 of	 the	
competitive	system	of	Market	Economy	to	satisfy	certain	wants,	collective	in	nature”	








Musgrave	 reformulated	 the	 “public	 household”	 model	 of	 his	 dissertation	 into	 a	
larger	 American	 synthesis	 of	 different	 strands	 of	 public	 finance.	 His	 normative	
theory	assessed	public	expenditures	and	taxation	from	the	point	of	view	of	modern	
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welfare	economics.	 It	 revolved	around	a	 central	budget	 composed	of	sub-budgets,	
each	 corresponding	 to	 a	 revenue-expenditure	 process	 oriented	 to	 a	 specific	
function:	macroeconomic	stabilization,	provision	for	the	satisfaction	of	social	wants,	





Unfolding the Household Analogy 
In	 this	 last	 section,	 I	 draw	 attention	 to	 three	 specific	 points	 of	 correspondence	
between	the	private	household	and	Musgrave’s	Public	household.	These	household	




The Communal Basis 
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society	 led	 to	 a	 specific	 economic	 and	 later	 sociological	 knowledge	 on	 its	
functioning.	 In	 his	 dissertation,	 Musgrave	 argued	 that	 the	 budget	 planner	 could	
provide	 goods	 to	 satisfy	 both	 individual	 and	 collective	 wants.	 Both	 had	 to	 be	
compared,	 homogenized,	 to	 build	 an	 ordering	 of	 national	 priorities	 for	 public	
expenditures.	 For	 Musgrave,	 this	 task	 relied	 on	 a	 “sociological	 analysis”,	 or	
knowledge	of	the	“sociological	process”	(Musgrave	1937,	337,	348).	For	Aristotle,	a	
community	had	a	common	purpose,	it	was	organized	toward	a	common	goal.	In	the	
contractarian	 tradition,	 the	 common	purpose	of	 civil	 society	 is	mutual	 protection:	
the	 state	 emerges	 to	 protect	 the	 citizens	 from	 aggression	 –	whether	 the	 threat	 is	
internal	or	external	to	the	community.	Contemporary	pluralistic	societies	cannot	be	
said	 to	have	 such	 a	 unique	 purpose.	Nevertheless,	 a	 community	 has	 something	 in	
common:	shared	understandings	and	values.	Members	might	not	share	all	the	same	
values,	 but	 stable	 communities	might	 share	 some	political	 values	which	 allow	 for	
what	John	Rawls	called	an	overlapping	consensus.	The	possibility	for	a	shared	sense	
of	justice	is	one	starting	point	to	justify	merit	goods	(Musgrave	1987).	
In	 his	 dissertation,	 Musgrave	 (1937,	 79–80)	 already	 noted	 that	 by	
prioritizing	some	wants	over	others,	the	public	economy	was	an	ethical	and	political	
realm.	 In	 a	 community	where	more	 values	 are	 shared,	 it	 is	 feasible	 to	 endow	 the	
state	with	responsibilities	to	provide	goods	which	foster	a	language,	a	culture	and	a	
specific	 view	 of	 the	 good	 life	 (through	 education,	 for	 instance).	 If	 these	 collective	
moral	 aspirations	 are	widely	 shared,	 then	 the	 provision	 of	merit	 goods	 to	 satisfy	
them	need	not	be	a	problematic	restriction	of	individual	freedom.	
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2995447
	 33	
Furthermore,	the	existence	of	a	community	with	interpersonal	ties	allows	for	
the	 assumption	 that	 individuals	 will	 act	 in	 other-regarding	 ways,	 whether	 it	 be	
altruistic	or	a	stronger	communal	spirit.	The	idea	that	individuals	follow	non-selfish	
motivations	 when	 acting	 in	 their	 collective	 capacity	 on	 matters	 that	 concern	 the	
whole	 community	 is	 central	 to	 the	 discussion	 of	 public	 goods	 in	 the	 German	
tradition.	The	communal	basis	of	the	concept	was	not	acknowledged	by	Musgrave	in	
the	1950s,	at	a	 time	when	methodological	 individualism	and	a	neo-positivist	spirit	
were	 very	 strong	 in	 economics,	 but	 he	 did	 defend	 it	 later	 in	 his	 life	 (Desmarais-
Tremblay,	2021).		
A Central Direction 
Models	of	the	household	presume	a	central	decision	maker.	In	the	traditional	oikos,	
just	as	in	the	husbandry	literature,	the	father	was	the	master	and	decision	maker.	He	
could	 direct	 the	 economic	 activities	 of	 the	 other	 members	 towards	 the	 common	
good	 of	 the	 family.	 In	Musgrave’s	 public	 household,	 decisions	 about	 the	 revenue-
expenditure	process	are	 implicitly	made	by	a	 central	planner.	 In	an	early	paper	 in	
which	 he	 defended	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 public	 capital	 budget,	 Musgrave	 drew	 the	
analogy:	“The	private	householder	when	arranging	his	monthly	budget	will	allocate	
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public	 household	 as	 a	 planned	 unit	 which	 “is	 essentially	 communistic”;	 at	 an	
abstract	 level,	 “the	 theory	of	Public	Economy	 is	 identical	with	 that	of	 the	 socialist	
economy”	(Musgrave	1937,	60,	74).	
As	 Gunnar	 Myrdal	 remarked,	 the	 very	 act	 of	 economizing	 assumed	 the	
existence	 of	 a	 conscious	 purposeful	 agent.	 The	 terminological	 legacy	 allowed	
economists	 to	 conceptualize	 a	 social	 household	 (gesellschaflichen	
Wirtschaftsführung)	oriented	toward	a	purpose	(Myrdal	1932,	140	ff.).	This	way	of	
looking	 at	 the	 state	 as	 a	 planning	 unit	 was	 reinforced	 under	 the	 influence	 of	
Weberian	 economic	 sociology	 in	which	 ideal	 types,	 like	 the	 public	 household,	 are	
often	 conceptualized	as	 rationally	oriented	 toward	a	goal.	Yet,	 the	 central	planner	
need	not	be	an	 autocrat.	Their	 job	 is	 to	 respect	 the	values	of	 the	 community.	The	
collective	 goods	 provided	 by	 the	 public	 household	 have	 to	 reflect,	 in	 theory,	
individual	preferences.	Hence,	the	problem	of	the	allocation	branch	is	rather	similar	
to	 that	of	 the	socialist	market	economy	(Musgrave	1959,	46	n.1).	Yet,	merit	wants	
represent	 an	 exception	 to	 this	 mechanical	 solution	 because	 they	 do	 not	 respect	
everyone’s	 preferences,	 or	 at	 least	 not	 their	 revealed	 preferences.	 However,	
Musgrave	thought	that	they	could	be–or	should	be–made	compatible	with	western	
democratic	 values	 (Musgrave	 1999,	 31).	 Still,	 in	 stark	 contrast	 with	 Buchanan,	
Musgrave	 implicitly	 assumed	 that	 the	 central	 planner	 was	 benevolent	 (see	
Buchanan,	1999,	89).		
The	 last	 point	 of	 comparison	 which	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	 centrally	 planned	
dimension	of	the	household	is	the	possibility	of	operating	transfers	in	kind.	Just	as	








Transfers	 in-kind	 was	 the	 first	 conceptualization	 of	 merit	 goods	 enunciated	 by	




Consumption to Satisfy Needs 
Both	 the	 domestic	 and	 the	 public	 household	 aim	 at	 satisfying	 the	 needs	 of	 their	
members.	 In	 the	 case	of	 the	public	household,	 its	purpose	 is	 to	 “achieve	optimum	
satisfaction	 of	 wants”	 (Musgrave	 1937,	 73).	 The	 nature	 of	 the	 public	 goods	 and	
services	 it	 provides	 is	 defined	 by	 the	 specifics	 of	 the	 consumption	 acts,	 not	 the	
production	 processes.	 Public	 goods	 can	 be	 produced	 by	 private	 firms	 and	 then	
bought	by	the	government	and	distributed	to	users.	Whereas	Buchanan	insisted	that	
public	goods	were	 jointly	supplied,	 for	Samuelson,	 the	specific	nature	of	the	goods	
lay	 in	 the	 jointness	of	 their	 consumption.	By	 the	end	of	 the	 sixties,	Musgrave	was	
convinced	 that	 the	 most	 important	 criterion	 for	 the	 public	 provision	 of	 social	
(collective)	 goods	 was,	 as	 he	 called	 it,	 the	 non-rivalness	 in	 their	 consumption	









needs	 are	 satisfied.	 The	 market	 does	 a	 very	 good	 job	 at	 allocating	 resources	 to	
satisfy	most	of	the	needs	of	the	community,	and	the	public	household	should	aim	at	




(see	 Musgrave,	 1957,	 341).	 It	 is	 true	 that	 some	 merit	 goods	 represented	 public	
encroachment	 upon	 individual	 private	 choices,	 but	 they	 had	 to	 be	 democratically	
supported,	 and	 could	 not	 be	 arbitrary	 like	 the	 cameralist	 edicts.	 One	 important	
feature	of	the	household	approach	which	sets	it	apart	from	the	way	markets	satisfy	
needs	 is	 the	 assumption	 of	 interpersonal	 comparisons.	 The	 head	 of	 a	 family	
constantly	 assesses	 the	 relative	 urgency	 of	 the	 needs	 of	 the	members	 in	 deciding	
how	to	invest	time	and	spend	money.	Likewise,	Musgrave	assumed	that	a	science	of	
society	 could	 provide	 the	 economist	 (or	 the	 social	 planner)	 with	 a	 “social	 value	
scale”	 (a	 direct	 antecedent	 of	 the	 social	 welfare	 function)	 in	 order	 to	 decide	 how	
much	 public	 money	 was	 needed	 for	 different	 goals.	 This	 implied	 making	
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interpersonal	comparisons	of	welfare,	which	did	not	seem	to	trouble	Musgrave	very	
much	 in	 the	 1930s.	 Following	 Lionel	 Robbins’s	 condemnation	 interpersonal	
comparison	 of	 welfare,	 a	 New	 Welfare	 Economics	 emerged	 to	 draw	 policy	
recommendations	on	narrower,	 allegedly	more	 scientific,	bases.	Musgrave	wanted	
his	 theory	 to	 be	 useful	 for	 public	 decision	 and	 thus	 had	 to	 stay	 closer	 to	 the	 “old	
welfare”	 of	 A.C.	 Pigou.	 Musgrave	 held	 to	 an	 objective	 conception	 of	 economic	
welfare:	“The	capacity	to	enjoy	benefits	is	after	all	but	part	of	the	general	nature	of	
‘man.’	 It	 being	 the	 generally	 accepted	 procedure	 to	 define	 certain	 general	
characteristics	of	men,	there	is	no	reason	why	no	typical	degree	of	intensity	for	the	
enjoyment	of	benefits	could	be	assumed”	(Musgrave	1937,	274).	Even	in	his	Theory,	






1974,	31).	 To	 be	 sure,	 the	 provision	 of	merit	 goods	only	 aims	 at	 attaining	 certain	
minimum	standards	of	consumption	(or	maximum	standards	of	demerit	goods),	not	
at	a	radical	equalization	of	conditions.		
                                               
10	 For	 elements	 of	 a	 genealogy	 of	Musgrave’s	 expression	 of	 merit	 wants,	 see	 Desmarais-
Tremblay	2017b.	





because	 it	 encroached	 upon	 the	 norm	of	 consumer	 sovereignty,	 and	 they	 accused	
Musgrave	of	defending	paternalistic	policies.	Yet,	in	fact,	the	paternalist	quality	may	






between	 the	 family	 and	 the	 state	 has	 deep	 roots	 in	 the	 history	 of	 economic	
discourse.	
In	Ancient	Greece,	œconomia	was	a	practical	discourse	focused	on	improving	
the	 quality	 of	 life	 by	 way	 of	 good	 management	 of	 the	 household,	 but	 also	 very	
concerned	 with	 the	 good	 life.	 Some	 strands	 of	 discourse	 have	 perpetuated	 this	
approach	 to	 economic	 life.	 For	 instance,	 in	 early	 modern	 times,	 the	 Cameralists	
connected	 the	 power	 and	 greatness	 of	 rulers	 to	 the	well-being	 of	 the	 population.	
They	proposed	a	benevolent	governmentality	of	populations	by	way	of	direct,	non-
juridical,	 interventions.	 The	 first	 treatises	 on	 political	 economy	 also	 framed	 the	
subject	as	an	extension	of	the	rule	of	the	father	to	that	of	a	kingdom.	





who	 could	 shape	 their	 lives	 as	 they	 saw	 fit	 thanks	 to	 their	 rational	 powers.	 They	
argued	 that	 a	 stable	 and	 just	 republic	 had	 to	 govern	 these	 rational	 and	 self-
interested	 individuals	 through	 legislation.	 This	 change	 of	 conception	 was	
concomitant	with	the	rise	of	civil	society	as	an	autonomous	sphere	of	action	which	
gradually	 took	 more	 and	 more	 space	 in	 the	 life	 of	 individuals	 (with	 respect	 to	
domestic	 and	 political	 life).	 Political	 economy	 theorized	 the	 (nomological)	 laws	 of	
this	 new	 (almost)	 self-regulating	 commercial	 society.	 In	 the	 process,	 political	
economy	 carved	 its	 boundaries	 with	 respect	 to	 political	 theory	 and	 moral	
philosophy.	
Nevertheless,	 practical	 discourse	 did	 not	 disappear	 from	 economics.	 For	
instance,	the	“contradictions”	of	this	apparently	self-regulating	economy	gave	rise	to	
many	 idealistic	 solutions	 to	 the	 Social	 question	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century.	 Chief	
among	 them	 was	 the	 mixed	 economy	 with	 an	 interventionist	 state	 taking	 over	
responsibilities	of	the	family	and	charities.	Although	they	carried	many	of	the	ways	
of	 thinking	 of	 prior	 economic	 discourse,	 the	 new	 economic	 theories	 of	 the	 state	
accepted	 the	 liberal	 reconfiguration,	 thus	 incorporating	 a	 tension	 between	 the	
centrally	directed	welfare	orientation	of	the	domestic	household	and	public	liberal	
values.	 These	 ideas	 flourished	 in	 the	 German-speaking	 world	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	
nineteenth	century	and	 in	the	 interwar	years	of	 the	twentieth	century	before	they	
were	 disseminated	 in	 Europe	 and	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 Raised	 and	 trained	 in	
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Germany,	Richard	Abel-Musgrave	brought	elements	of	this	tradition	with	him	in	the	
United	 States	 and	 helped	 to	 keep	 alive	 the	 breadth	 of	 German	 scholarship	 in	
Staatswithshaft.	
This	historical	sketch	does	not	pretend	to	be	a	comprehensive	history	of	the	
analogy	 between	 the	 domestic	 economy	 and	 the	 state.	 However,	 I	 have	 provided	
sufficient	evidence	to	make	the	point	of	a	continuous	use	of	the	analogy	throughout	
the	history	of	economic	and	political	thought.	As	every	generation	of	economists—
until	 recently—read	 the	 classical	 texts,	 the	 analogy	was	 transmitted	over	 time.	 In	
the	 twentieth	 century,	 economists	 have	 devised	 theories	 of	 the	 state	 borrowing	
from	models	of	the	market	and	that	of	the	family.	I	have	pointed	out	three	elements	
of	 Musgrave’s	 public	 household	 which	 relate	 to	 a	 domestic	 model:	 relying	 on	 a	
community,	assuming	a	central	direction,	and	being	oriented	toward	a	specific	goal	
(that	of	wants	satisfaction).	These	points	are	exactly	what	advocates	of	a	catallaxis	
approach	 to	 the	economy	 like	Hayek	and	Buchanan	would	 contest	 in	an	economic	
theory	of	the	state.	




of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 the	German	 state	 took	 over	 some	welfare	 duties	which	
were	traditionally	fulfilled	by	the	family	or	by	charities.	In	the	UK	and	in	the	US,	the	
welfare	 state	 grew	 rapidly	 after	 the	 Second	World	War.	 It	 is	 in	 this	 context	 that	
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the	 American	 postwar	 fear	 of	 socialism	 cleansed	 the	 economic	 vocabulary	 of	 any	
reference	to	central	planning.	Hence,	Musgrave	eventually	stopped	using	the	word	
planning	 to	 describe	 his	 general	 approach	 to	 public	 economy	 and	 used	 the	 noun	
only	 in	 the	 more	 modest	 expression	 of	 “budget	 planning.”	 As	 he	 reflected	 many	
years	 later,	 the	 semantics	 of	 “planning”	 had	 become	 loaded	 and	 politically	 more	
delicate	after	the	war	(Musgrave	1977,	53).	The	result	of	these	forces	might	explain	
why	 the	 expression	 “public	 household”	 that	Musgrave	 imported	 from	 the	German	
tradition	was	not	picked	up	 in	 the	nascent	 field	of	public	 economics	 in	 the	1970s.	
Already	 in	 their	 introductory	 textbook	 to	 public	 finance,	Musgrave	 and	Musgrave	
(1973)	 did	 not	 use	 the	 expression	 “public	 household,”	 but	 rather	 the	 expression	
“public	sector.”	 In	44	years,	 the	expression	“public	household”	appeared	only	 four	
times	 in	 the	 Journal	 of	 Public	 Economics.	 It	 is	 nowhere	 to	 be	 found	 in	 the	 five	
volumes	 of	 the	 Handbook	 of	 public	 economics.	 When	 Musgrave	 defended	 his	
dissertation	in	1937,	there	was	no	expression	for	the	economic	theory	of	the	public	
sector—he	had	to	import	and	translate	the	German	concepts.11	
                                               
11	 The	 expression	 “public	 sector”	was	 used	 only	 twice	 in	 published	 articles	 in	 the	 JSTOR	
database	before	1937,	compared	with	522	occurrences	between	1937	and	1959,	and	73	160	
occurrences	between	1959	and	2007.	(http://dfr.jstor.org)	
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Like	 Musgrave’s	 public	 household,	 the	 new	 behavioral	 public	 policy	 is	 welfare	
oriented	 and	 centrally	 directed.	 As	 a	matter	 of	 fact,	 recent	 scholarship	makes	 the	






consider	 them	 as	 autonomous	 rational	 beings	who	 can	 shape	 their	 own	 lives	 and	
deliberate	in	the	public	sphere	about	the	type	of	governmental	action	they	wish	to	
endorse.	
                                               
12	See	Munro	2009;	Mann	and	Gairing	2012;	Kirchgässner	2017;	White	2016.	
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